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For a field of study still as nascent as the one the historians of the 
European Union’s legal system find themselves, it is hugely 
beneficial to receive the constructive criticism of experienced and 
important political scientists and lawyers. By highlighting the 
strengths and exposing the weaknesses of the existing research of the 
“New Historians,” progress will certainly be facilitated in filling 
existing lacuna, following the paths that these new insights open up, 
and, hopefully, inspiring other researchers to begin work in this 
important but still incompletely addressed area.  
One purpose of my response is to speak to and, where possible, 
provide answers to the prompting in the commentaries on Morten 
Rasmussen’s opening paper from the perspective of a legal historian 
working closely in the area of European studies.1 Certainly, one of 
the most important questions from all of the commentaries is what 
the respective disciplines involved can learn from our new legal 
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 1. See Francesca Bignami, Rethinking the Legal Foundations of the European 
Constitutional Order: The Lessons of the New Historical Research, 28 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1311 (2013); Michelle Egan, Toward a New History in European 
Law: New Wine in Old Bottles?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223 (2013); Mark A. 
Pollack, The New EU Legal History: What’s New, What’s Missing?, 28 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1257 (2013); Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European 
Public Law: The New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 
(2013) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law]. 
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history and what, if anything, is “new” about them at all. At the core 
of these questions is what, as one prominent legal historian has 
asked, is the “cash out value” involved here?2 I hope to explore the 
underlying importance of legal history generally in this contribution 
and how it relates to a legal profession in which a necessary 
advocacy and a teleological reading of sources do not necessarily 
harmoniously sync with the purported objectivity of historical 
science. I will touch upon the recently made distinction between 
“applied” and “pure” legal history3 and how the new EU legal history 
can contribute to those discussions. I ultimately hope to use the 
commentaries provided to reflect on how the group of New 
Historians—myself included—can self-reflect about the current state 
of our own research and identify ways in which we can further 
progress. 
I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW HISTORIANS 
In his contribution to this issue, Morten Rasmussen attempts to 
provide a preliminary overview of what the “story” of the 
development of European law looks like given the contributions of 
new research undertaken by historians.4 Special emphasis in his 
piece falls on the actors who shaped the development of EU law, 
particularly at the transnational level. Rasmussen’s in-depth 
recollecting of the role of the European Commission’s Legal Service 
and its allied academic associations in pushing for a teleological, 
constitutional reading of the Rome Treaties against the hesitancy of a 
reluctant and conservative European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) is 
revelatory. This story can only possibly be a prelude to a much richer 
narrative because “there are still many questions and even entire 
subfields [of this legal history] that remain unexplored.”5  
Nonetheless, Rasmussen describes an evolution that was much 
more contested in nature and involved a much larger number of 
 
 2. Mary Dudziak, What’s the Cash Out Value, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Oct. 20, 
2010, 7:24 AM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/whats-cash-out-
value-more-aalsinterview.html. 
 3. Alfred Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal History, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 233, 
233–240 (2013). 
 4. See generally Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law, 
supra note 1. 
 5. Id. at 1218. 
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actors—national and European—than had been assumed in the 
existing body of political science literature and legal scholarship 
amply described in the start of his article.6 As such, Rasmussen 
emphasizes the relative and quite unexpected complexity of the legal 
history under scrutiny here, in which national reactions to key ECJ 
decisions feed back in a profoundly constitutive way into the 
European system and in which even public opinion and media 
reaction play an influential role in legal outcomes.7  
Driven by this initial historical impulse, Rasmussen goes further 
still, using these findings to reassess the contemporary understanding 
of successfully “constitutionalized” treaties that has become 
ubiquitous in multi-disciplinary scholarship on the EU.8 He boldly 
asserts that the “ECJ did not manage to ‘constitutionalize’ the 
Treaties of Rome before 1992,” arguing that the “relatively limited” 
impact of the Court’s case law and “continued contestation and 
resistance” offered by the member states means that we might better 
understand the functioning of law in the European Union as a deeply 
contested “constitutional practice.”9 This “practice” is comprised of a 
still-not-fully-reconciled duality in European law, in which the pro-
Europeanists in the Commission, Parliament, and academic 
associations posit a constitutional role for the Court and the 
Treaties.10  
At the same time, this constitutional claim has been only very 
reluctantly accepted by the member states’ governments and 
judiciaries, who are bound to pre-existing national constitutional 
orders. Acceptance has followed only under conditions of co-
authorship in the system11 and in some cases under heavy reluctance 
 
 6. Id. parts I & II. 
 7. See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST 
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) [hereinafter DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE] (providing an example of the role played by public opinion in framing a 
national court’s resistance to European law). 
 8. Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law, supra note 1. 
 9. Id. at 1219. 
 10. Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practise: The Role of the 
European Law Associations, in SOCIETAL ACTORS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
POLITY-BUILDING AND POLICY-MAKING 1958–1992 173, 173–196 (Kaiser & 
Meyer eds., 2013). 
 11. Bill Davies, Pushing Back: What Happens When Member States Resist the 
ECJ: A Multi-Modal Approach to the History of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. 
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to participate or apply EU law at all.12 Rasmussen admits that 
contestation should not be a surprise and that this happened even in 
more established federal polities. Yet equally, he argues that by 
adopting uncritically the teleological and “deeply normative” 
interpretation that the Treaties “will develop into a European 
constitution,” we limit our ability “to discern the extent to which the 
constitutional practice was contested and even more crucially 
empirically trace the way European public law was actually 
practiced in the Community/Union and the member states.”13 As 
such, the replacement of the “constitutionalization” term with the 
more neutral moniker of “constitutional practice” allows firstly for a 
more balanced and well-documented exploration of the “true history” 
of the EU’s legal system, which, secondly, Rasmussen ambitiously 
contends, offers a more informed basis for discussion and potential 
solving of ongoing legitimization crises suffered by the supranational 
institutions.14 
II. NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES? 
With these two objectives of the New Historians clearly in mind, 
the Biblical reference in the title of Michelle Egan’s commentary 
takes on an important secondary meaning.15 If the promise of the 
New History is correct, then it does seem that the old bottles—in this 
case, the long-established conclusions of political science and legal 
scholarship about the constitutional nature of the Treaties—cannot 
contain the empirical reality emerging from the national and 
European archives. As Luke details, “the bottles shall perish.”16  
 
EUR. HIST. 417 (2012) [hereinafter Davies, Pushing Back]. 
 12. For example, Danish and British courts were particularly reluctant to send 
cases to the ECJ. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, From International Law 
to a European Recthsgemeinschaft: Towards a New History of European Law, 
1950–1979, in INSTITUTIONS AND DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 
1973–83 (Johnny Laursen ed., 2013) [hereinafter Davies & Rasmussen, From 
International Law to a European Recthsgemeinschaft]; see also Alec Stone Sweet 
& Thomas Brunell, The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical 
Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961-1995, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 66, 66–97 
(1998) (offering a quantitative analysis of member states’ participation in the ECJ). 
 13. Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law, supra note 1, 
at 1221. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Egan, supra note 1. 
 16. Luke 5:36-39 (King James). 
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But lest historians get drunk on their initial enological successes, 
Egan highlights a particularly important set of issues that historians 
must address if their findings are to find a foothold in the work of 
other disciplines. Foremost among these is the need for the new 
historical studies to “embrace bigger causal questions of theoretical 
and historical interest such as the relationship of law to contemporary 
democracy, the rights and conceptions of citizenship, the relationship 
of law to market capitalism, and the issues of internationalism, 
sovereignty, and legal pluralism.”17 Hunkering down into the silos of 
specialized, case- or period-specific studies, as has been the case in 
much of the New History scholarship to date, precludes the 
possibility of writing a history of European law as part of a broader 
“administrative, regulatory, and judicial realm” with a greater 
relevance for the large number of scholars who understand law in 
this way.18 Egan believes that “a comparative assessment of the 
relationship between legal supremacy and federalism using studies in 
U.S. legal history may shed light on the interactions between the 
central and constituent legal units that provide ways of re-imagining 
European legal integration.”19 Despite the best efforts of the EU legal 
historians, it may be that their chosen object of study is “neither 
unique nor unusual.”20  
In highlighting the comparison with the development of the 
federal legal structures in the United States, Egan points out the 
apparent similarities between the roles played by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the ECJ in interpreting the “constitutional” order as 
autonomous judicial actors and as foci for the contestation of much 
broader political-judicial battles. In both systems, the “federal” 
judiciaries found themselves in multi-tiered systems, in which their 
awareness of being young institutions with delegated powers made 
their task of ensuring the efficacy and uniformity of the nascent legal 
systems especially complicated. As such, that similar legal 
experiences have been felt in both is “unsurprising.”21 In the 
American case, pressure from the economic power of the 
industrialized north demanded a more active role for federal courts 
 
 17. Egan, supra note 1, at 1235. 
 18. See id. at 1234. 
 19. See id. at 1235−36. 
 20. See id. at 1246. 
 21. See id. at 1244. 
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willing to invoke the commerce clause to remove obstacles to the 
flow of goods and services. Despite no small measure of resistance, 
the continuing expansion of federal judicial jurisdiction went hand-
in-hand with the growth of a national economy and an administrative 
state to regulate it. This “rise of the jural state”22 was accompanied 
by greater police powers, social policies, and definition of the 
concept of rights and citizenship well into the twentieth century. 
Egan highlights the close similarity to the legal developments in 
Europe: the growth of the social regulatory state, enabled by the ECJ 
in some cases, as well as the firming up of definitions of citizenship 
and private rights, which were preceded by a similar demand for the 
ECJ’s services from businesses, industries, and litigants looking for 
outcomes that favored inter-member states’ trade. Here, Egan 
harkens back to the neo-functionalist scholarship of Stone Sweet and 
Brunell, whose work in the late 1990s posited a correlative 
relationship between inter-state trade levels and activity at the ECJ, 
but which has come under fire from various quarters recently.23  
Egan’s rejoinder about the importance of comparison and breadth 
of the theoretical scope of historical scholarship is extremely 
pertinent. In regard to the first issue, the “precedent” of the evolution 
of federal power in the United States is an ever-present thorn in the 
side of the New Historian. We know that when the first President of 
the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, called for a “Supreme 
Court” for Europe,24 a certain type of integration based on the 
American experience was intended by (at least some of25) the EU’s 
 
 22. See id. at 1240. 
 23. See generally Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 12. This article has long 
played a role in shaping views on the ECJ, EU law, and EU trade. For a more 
contextualized approach that questions the triadic relationship, see Davies & 
Rasmussen, From International Law to a European Recthsgemeinschaft, supra 
note 12. 
 24. WALTER HALLSTEIN, UNITED EUROPE: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 
(1962). 
 25. New Historical work emphasizes just how different the starting positions of 
the member states were in this regard. The German position was one extreme in 
the debate. On the whole, the French position won out. See Anne Boerger-de 
Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les Négociations du Traité de Paris Instituant la 
CECA, 18 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 7, 7–33 (2008); see also Anne Boerger-De 
Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950-57: The Legal 
History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 339, 339-56 
(2012) [hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European 
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own “Founding Fathers.” Moreover, the field of EU legal studies 
sits—perhaps increasingly shakily—on the “Integration through 
Law” research project that explicitly used “the United States federal 
system as a comparative point of reference.”26 The comparison seems 
so easy and attractive that, even thirty years later, it still draws 
scholars together to discuss27 and publish28 on the viability of a 
US−EU comparison. And yet despite all of this, the comparison still 
remains enigmatic, and there has not yet been a definitive statement 
on the benefits and viability of the comparison. Why, after so much 
time and scholarship, is there still hesitancy to use the same kind of 
terminology to describe the two judicial systems? Even if Rasmussen 
concedes that “ECJ case law contains important federal doctrines,”29 
is it simply that, despite the resemblance, these are two very different 
animals and that comparing the development of a pre-industrial 
republic in the late eighteenth century with a post-war project to 
unify well-established European nation states with centuries-old 
enmities and extremely strong, entrenched national identities is just 
not possible? Even if we distill out of the historical substance just the 
notion of two complex federal polities in the making, Rasmussen 
contends that the comparison is “mistaken.”30 Just because the ECJ 
says that it has constitutionalized and federalized the Treaties does 
not make it so. Indeed, the question as to whether the ECJ has 
managed to promote the federalization of Europe or whether this has 
been a high-profile failed attempt31 remains the impetus for most of 
the historical research being undertaken.  
So if the viability of the US−EU comparison in substantive terms 
remains contentious, what other lessons can historians draw from 
Egan’s commentary? In fact, very important ones indeed. The 
 
Law]. 
 26. Mauro Capelletti, Preface to Integration Through Law, 1 METHODS TOOLS 
AND INSTITUTIONS (Mauro Capelletti et al. eds., 1986). 
 27. A workshop, The Comparative Constitutional Evolution of the European 
Union and the United States, was held at The American University in December 
2010, which four of the five authors in this issue attended. 
 28. ANDREW GLENCROSS, WHAT MAKES THE EU VIABLE?: EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE ANTEBELLUM US EXPERIENCE (2009). 
 29. Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law, supra note 1, 
at 1220. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 1220–21. 
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relative maturity of U.S. federalism has given legal historical 
scholars of that system greater time and material to develop much 
more advanced theoretical means for considering the role of the 
judiciary in the construction and transformation of complex federal 
structures. Egan lists some of these approaches in great detail. For 
one, the jurisprudential tradition of the court as an institution is 
important and, as Egan recounts, the position of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in relation to social rights and the welfare state remains a bone 
of contention today.32 This is an avenue for much further research 
from a European perspective, though we might find prospects for 
much variation between courts and constellations of judges much 
less, seeing as, to a large extent, the “jurisprudence” of the ECJ is 
locked—broadly—into place by its obligations under the Treaties.33  
But even despite this constraint, the initial findings of the 
historical research indicate that there are still differences between 
“courts,” particularly when key personnel come to the bench or the 
Court President position changes hands. In fact, one of Rasmussen’s 
most important findings is that the ECJ in 1963 was extremely 
reluctant to hand down the Van Gend en Loos ruling, given that a lot 
of the judges were conservative in their reading of the “original 
nature” of European law.34 In fact, Rasmussen has contended that a 
good approximation suggests a 4−3 vote in the Van Gend Court, with 
the deciding vote coming from the unexpected corner of the Gaullist 
French appointment, Robert Lecourt.35 It was when Lecourt came to 
the Court Presidency that the ECJ entered its most proactive phase in 
the early 1970s.36 Much more time and effort on the part of the 
historians must be spent exploring the jurisprudential ideas in the 
 
 32. See Egan, supra note 1. 
 33. The Court, like the other supranational institutions, are required by Article 
2 of the Rome Treaty to “promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the States belonging to it.” Treaty of Rome art. 2, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 3., available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/ 
documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. 
 34. Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European 
Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952−65, 21 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 379 (2012). 
 35. See id. at 388−89. 
 36. Davies & Rasmussen, From International Law to a European 
Recthsgemeinschaft, supra note 12. 
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Court. Even if the deliberations remain secret, opinions and ideas can 
be found in academic publications, speeches, and private letters in 
personal and official archives. While this is no guarantee of voting 
behavior, it is certainly informative in discerning conservative 
judges, like the German Otto Riese,37 and fervent integrationists like 
Lecourt.  
Secondly, the influence on outcomes of the personal preferences 
of judges, facilitated in the United States by widespread media 
coverage and the publication of dissenting opinions, has been the 
subject of wide study in U.S. legal history. While made extremely 
difficult in regards to the much more guarded ECJ, it is possible, 
through careful tracing of academic and professional publications 
pre- and post-tenure, to build a picture of a European justice’s 
preferences. How and whether this translates into actual voting 
behavior will always be much more difficult to tell. Initial historical 
work in this area suggests that a key variable in judicial preferences 
is their preference for Europe, so that when major changes in 
personnel on the ECJ took place in 1967, the resulting years saw a 
much more aggressively integrationist institution than the Van Gend 
Court, which is why there is so much national “resistance” in the 
1970s, not in the years immediately after the “revolution.”38  
Thirdly, while EU legal historians laud the finding that “we need 
to include a wider range of actors to understand the development of 
European public law,”39 this already appears to be a given for U.S. 
legal historians, and the mobilization of “counterthrusts”40 against the 
federal judiciary are part of the historical canon. Recent historical 
scholarship on Europe has emphasized not just the mobilization of 
professionals, academics, and public figures in favor of the 
 
 37. Otto Riese (1894−1974) was a Law Professor at the University of Lausanne 
in 1950, became Chief Justice on the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe in 1951, 
before moving to the ECJ in 1952 and serving twelve years in Luxembourg as a 
judge. He favored national control over the European institutions. See Ernst von 
Caemmerer, Walter Hallstein, & Ernst Steindorff, PROBLEME DES EUROPA ?ISCHEN 
RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FU ?R WALTER HALLSTEIN ZU SEINEM 65. GEBURTSTAG 420 
(1966). 
 38. See Davies & Rasmussen, From International Law to a European 
Recthsgemeinschaft, supra note 12. 
 39. See Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law, supra note 
1, at 1218. 
 40. See Egan, supra note 1, at 1248. 
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constitutional idea, but also often that this mobilization proved to be 
a failure—almost fully in France41 and to a very large extent in 
Germany.42 One area in which the breadth of the actors involved in 
the formation of the European legal system is particularly relevant, 
and also one where I tend to emphasize more than my New Historian 
colleagues, is the general public. In the German reception of 
European law, influential media coverage ensured that there was a 
well-informed public forum that certainly played a role in the 
German Constitutional Court’s controversial reaction to important 
ECJ doctrine at the start of the 1970s. How else do we explain why 
the President of the German court would make the effort to appear in 
print, on the radio, and on television to explain the court’s 
reasoning?43 U.S. legal historians are already much further advanced 
in this area. We only have to consider Pauline Maier’s magnificent 
Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution 1787−1788 as a 
template for a similar investigation into European debates.44 This is 
made all the more compelling an investigation due to the prevalence 
of the “permissive consensus” argument—that early European 
publics did not care or know what their leaders were up to in 
Brussels—which still holds sway across much political science and 
public opinion scholarship.45 
Fourthly, the impact of institutional constraints on, and 
possibilities for, the U.S. courts has been a subject of study for 
almost as long as European integration has existed. Walter Murphy’s 
 
 41. See Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational 
Jurist Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practise of European Law, 21 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399, 414 (2012). 
 42. See Davies, Pushing Back, supra note 11, at 419−20 (exploring the German 
Constitutional Court’s controversial denial of European law’s primacy); Bill 
Davies, Meek Acceptance? The West German Ministries’ Reaction to the Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa Decisions, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 57, 59 (2009). 
 43. See Ernst Benda, Das Spannungsverhåltnis Von Grundrechten Und 
Übernationalen Recht, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 10.11 at 395−56 (1974); see 
also Interview with Ernst Benda, Zur Frage der Schaffung eines europäischen 
Grundrechtskatalog, Deutsche Welle, (Sept. 4, 1975). 
 44. See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010). 
 45. See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, Phantom Europe: Thirty Years of 
Survey Research on German Attitudes Toward European Integration, in 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 57−58 (Leon Hurwitz 
ed., 1980); LEON N. LINDBURG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, EUROPE’S WOULD-BE 
POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 53−63 (1970). 
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description of how an “intellectually respectable argument”46 in the 
dissent to Yakus v. United States persuaded a congressional 
committee to implement major procedural reform is certainly 
reminiscent of the early arguments about the perceived acceptance of 
the European legal revolution by the national governments due to the 
apolitical, legally authoritative reasoning of the ECJ.47 The New 
History has done much to undermine the idea that acceptance was 
widespread at all, but equally we are now seeing important examples 
of how the ECJ was forced to backtrack and change its case law 
because of the constraints imposed by influential national courts.48 
Indeed, there is much to be said for the argument that the ongoing 
controversy between the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ is 
a continuing reformulation of the original constraints imposed by the 
former on the latter in the 1970s.49 The strategic nature of ECJ 
decision making within the complex constellation of national, 
subnational, and European actors in the integration project certainly 
requires further investigation by historians in a broader range of 
cases. Whether the reality emerging from the archive sources can be 
interpreted best by rational choice theory, or any theory at all, is an 
intriguing question. Historians are uniquely well placed to answer 
this question and more, given their emphasis on systematic 
exploration of ministerial and government archives, which can reveal 
the world of political pressures facing the ECJ. 
Finally, Egan poses the broadest dilemma of all for the historians: 
What do the findings mean for our conceptualization of the rule of 
law, democracy, federalism, and compliance? While posing these 
questions in terms of a series of counterfactuals that historians tend 
to shy away from, Egan gets right to the heart of a crucially 
important issue. The choice not to create a constitutional document 
was made by democratically elected heads of governments and their 
representatives. The choice to make the Treaties a constitution was 
made by judges and legal officials with only a second order of 
 
 46. See WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 125 (1964) 
(noting that judges, senators, and representatives are open to persuasion by such 
arguments). 
 47. See Martin Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 53 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 537, 538 (1980). 
 48. See Davies, Pushing Back, supra note 11, at 424, 431−32. 
 49. See id. at 434−35. 
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democratic legitimacy (being delegated by democratically elected 
officials). What then are we to make of the “constitutionalization” of 
the Treaties against the background of a Community and then Union 
that has consistently and ever more struggled for a sense of 
legitimacy or even popularity among the people of Europe? It would 
seem that the ECJ’s attempt to constitutionalize European law has 
been to the benefit of the Commission and its expanding list of 
management competencies, particularly as the workings of the Fiscal 
Treaty become clearer.50 While historical scholarship has 
demonstrated that the ECJ and Commission have not always worked 
hand-in-glove in this regard,51 when they do, does it come at cost of 
further alienation from the European citizen? Can we then 
understand the position of the German Constitutional Court in its 
Solange line of jurisprudence, with its recurring call for democratic 
control over the European institutions, whether this be through the 
European or national parliaments, as an attempt to democratize the 
judicial mechanism vesting European law with supremacy? Equally, 
is the British Prime Minister’s promise to hold a referendum on 
succession less a cynical electoral ploy and instead a means of 
legitimating continued membership through a regular (and 
recurring?) call to the people?  
III. WHAT’S NEW? WHAT’S MISSING? 
An analogous counterfactual, begging the same questions about 
federalism and democracy, stands—tellingly—in Mark Pollack’s 
sharp commentary on Rasmussen’s paper.52 He asks “how Van Gend 
and other critical rulings might have been received in national 
capitals had it been known that this weightiest of rulings had been 
adopted by a bare majority over the objections of a sizable minority 
of judges—that a single vote had started a legal revolution and 
 
 50. See Legislation Against Euro-Counterfeiting, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/euro-protection/legislation/index_ 
en.htm (providing an example of an ideal-type expansion of supranational powers 
by stealthy “spillover” from the nascent criminal law procedures being developed 
by the European Commission in the area of euro banknote counterfeiting). 
 51. For instance, the ECJ frequently stymied Commission attempts to expand 
its reach in the area of competition policy. See Laurent Warlouzet & Tobias 
Witschke, The Difficult Path to an Economic Rule of Law: European Competition 
Policy, 1950–91, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 437 (2012). 
 52. See Pollack, supra note 1. 
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undermined national sovereignty for decades to come.”53  
As one of our most prolific American legal historian colleagues 
has pointed out, “legal history has moved from recording 
manifestations of the rule of law to actively investigating how law 
rules.”54 The more light we historians can shed on the early stages of 
the development of European law, the clearer answers to these 
questions of existential importance for the EU will become. That 
both scholars raise the same questions and hypotheticals—not just 
here, but throughout their analyses—is crucially important 
considering both are political scientists with great awareness of the 
ECJ in their work. In his piece, Pollack identifies four core 
assumptions about the European legal system found commonly in 
political science scholarship, namely on (i) the nature and 
preferences of the Court, (ii) competing views of judicial 
independence, (iii) European and national judicial interaction, and 
(iv) the constitutionalization paradigm.55 He then proceeds to 
skillfully assess and schematize the findings of the New Historians to 
address the ways in which these findings might force a revision of 
the theoretical assumptions (the “What’s New”). In essence, he aims 
to establish the “‘value added’ of this new scholarship.”56 
The “What’s Missing” portion of Pollack’s piece is what strikes 
me as most interesting, not just because Pollack (like Egan) poses 
such difficult and hugely insightful questions that my only response, 
aside from those given above in the “New Wine” section, can be 
“We’re getting there!” Most intriguingly, though, is that both 
political scientists focus in on almost an identical set of topics and 
issues. My fellow historians, take note! If our ultimate aim is to 
engage with and revise the theoretical models of political scientists, 
providing them with a healthy dose of correction from archive-based 
empirical narratives, we have here the opportunity to distill recurring 
substantive questions raised by the initial findings of our research. It 
is a fantastic opportunity to understand the concerns and thought 
processes of another discipline, allowing us to address them much 
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more directly and accurately. More generally, the concerns of 
historians and political scientists converge on questions of and 
factors affecting behavior, preferences, institutional constraints, 
decision making, and the role of ideas. Even if one group looks 
forward, the other back, there is much that one can do to inform the 
other. Yet, as historians, an essential internal debate we must have is 
whether this really is a sufficient “ultimate aim” in and of itself? To 
what extent can historical research fulfill the purpose of addressing 
contemporary assumptions or filling in the gaps left by necessity 
when trying to build predictive theory? As legal historians, the 
question becomes more acute, since we not only address academic 
theory, but in many cases, the narratives we retell relate directly or 
indirectly to contemporary legal doctrine, case law, and legislation. 
As the recurring counterfactuals above force us to consider, how and 
what we present about the evolution of the law and legal structures 
can have a profound impact on questions of essential importance to 
the life of the polity. This is not just applicable for the EU facing a 
severe legitimacy crisis, but equally for the United States, where 
judicial interpretation, particularly in a constitutional context, has 
relied on historical approaches as heavily as one would expect in a 
system where the common law features so importantly in legal 
training.  
In U.S. legal historiography, a current debate on the purpose of 
historical work revolves around the relevancy and importance of the 
distinction between “applied” and “pure” legal history and whether 
legal history must address contemporary structures. The proponent of 
the applied side, Alfred Brophy, describes this form of history as 
“deeply researched, serious scholarship that is motivated by, engages 
with, or speaks to contemporary issues,”57 differing from the much-
maligned but similarly focused “law office history,” in that the latter 
is “advocacy-oriented and unlikely to be good history.”58 Applied 
legal history “asks questions that are not solely about advocacy and it 
asks questions about meaning to the framing generation. It puts into 
context the issues that the framing generation faced.”59 It appears to 
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hold promise as a way to make historical narratives “useable”60 and 
accessible to scholars and students outside of the field by showing 
how legal change has occurred and by inspiring activism in such 
areas. Applied legal history is also work that “normalizes (or in some 
cases destabilizes) some contemporary practice by showing that it 
has antecedents (or lacks antecedents).”61 In accordance with this, 
Rasmussen’s conclusions “[offer] a revisionist account to the 
mainstream understanding of the history of European public law in 
law and the social sciences.”62 By allowing their conclusions to 
address the political scientific assumptions central to our general 
understanding of the ECJ, Rasmussen and the other New Historians 
appear to be engaging indirectly in a Euro-centric form of applied 
legal history, particularly if we remember just how important and 
contemporarily relevant the larger questions raised by both Egan and 
Pollack about federalism, legitimacy, and democracy are. Perhaps 
then, the New Historians offer a nuance to the bipolarity of “applied” 
and “pure” legal history, offering conclusions from legal history that 
can be used in contemporary debates by other disciplines to clear up 
uncertainties and falsehoods. This is a kind of “indirect applied” 
legal history that finds little need to redraw theoretical models but 
whose work is so embedded in the “contemporary” period that it 
cannot be anything other than applicable for understanding today’s 
world.  
That these analyses have been done in a rather unconscious way 
that remains largely unaware of the corollary debates in U.S. legal 
historiography could be to the detriment of the European-focused 
scholarship. The majority of the New Historians are historians of 
European integration in toto, not just of its legal structures. This 
offers obvious benefits and disadvantages, but as long as we write 
legal histories, we must be better aware of these disciplinary 
discussions. Critics of the applied approach, such as Karen Tani, 
point to the fact that legal history in this vein might fall into the trap 
of being labeled “normative” by default, since any “pure” legal 
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history, which does not carry an explicit contemporary relevance, 
would become merely “descriptive.”63 The prescriptiveness inherent 
in the political science and legal narratives is exactly what 
Rasmussen warns us against in the conclusion to his article.64 
Moreover, if history must necessarily be “useable,” as critics equally 
claim, then this may well shield the real reason for writing that 
history, at least in the author’s eyes, behind a mask of “applicability” 
that underserves the importance of the narrative being retold.65 If 
making the New History relevant and useful to our political science 
and legal scholar colleagues comes potentially at the cost of 
undermining the hoped-for objectivity and inherent curiosity in the 
narrative, is this a price worth paying? How can we write a history of 
EU law that retains the features of “pure” history, yet at the same 
time produce narratives that are applicable and able to respond to the 
questions of fundamental importance raised by scholars like Egan, 
Pollack, and Bignami? Perhaps there is then a strong need for the 
New Historians to self-reflect a little more and engage with the 
theoretical assumptions in their own field—legal history—than 
necessarily being driven by concerns from outside the discipline? 
These questions of application, usability, and normative impact 
strike at the heart of the historian’s discipline. A brief return to—
where else?—the past may be informative on this point. Herodotus, 
the West’s first historian, referred to the term “historia” as a sort of 
inquiry, a search to explain why the world was the way it was. To 
complete his own work, Herodotus scoured the sources of the eastern 
Mediterranean, weaving together the narrative that is now so familiar 
to us. His purpose in writing his Histories was dual: to preserve 
“from decay the remembrance of what men have done” (retelling a 
narrative of events and actions) and secondly to prevent the “great 
and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the Barbarians from losing 
their due meed of glory; and withal to put on record what were their 
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grounds of feuds” (explaining why the world today is the way it is).66 
In other words, the impetus for historical inquiry since the very 
beginning has always been twofold, and the great challenge facing 
the historian is being able to keep these two objectives in appropriate 
balance.  
IV. IF NOT A CONSTITUTION, THEN WHAT? 
The end product of well-researched, detailed historical scholarship 
is to provoke revisions of contemporary understanding through 
accurate retelling of past events. History is also very much a 
competition—a battle between competing interpretations of historical 
events. To the victor goes the spoils of shaping a small part of our 
understanding and the functioning of the contemporary world. The 
importance of the immediate subjects of legal history—laws, 
jurisprudence, and institutions that create and administer law—
makes the battle of interpretation in this field acutely important. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in Francesca Bignami’s commentary67 
from the perspective of a legal scholar, which seeks clarification on 
what EU law actually is, given this new interpretation. If the New 
Historians have been successful in at least raising questions about the 
constitutionalization paradigm, as Rasmussen claims to have done in 
his piece, then Bignami’s question is particularly pertinent. From a 
background as a EU legal scholar, the practical implications of this 
shift in how to view and comprehend the EU’s legal system in 
concrete terms is entirely understandable. If it’s no longer 
constitutional, then what is it?  
Rasmussen’s answer is that it is better to understand the system as 
a “constitutional practice,” in which “the continuation of national 
resistance to the present day makes it very uncertain to what extent 
the ECJ and the Commission have been successful in their endeavor 
of fully ‘constitutionalizing’ European law.”68 The New Historians 
have documented in various case studies69 the ways in which the 
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system designed by the Treaties was inherently weak with its 
reliance on national-level enforcement,70 the unreliability of data 
based on the preliminary ruling mechanism given historical context,71 
and just how contested the case law of the ECJ has been (and 
remains).72 As a result, the idea and rhetoric of “constitutional law” 
promoted by the supranational institutions and by the group of 
academics in this paradigm remains just that—a particular 
interpretation of how European law works. A historical examination 
of how it evolved in this manner points strongly to the conclusion 
that, in fact, it does not work in this way. The idea has been 
contested, challenged, and even modified73 as a result of national 
resistance. Importantly, the central idea of the constitutional 
paradigm—that the Treaties in themselves give constitutional 
legitimacy to the supranational institutions—has been rejected by the 
national high courts.74 In this alternative vision, legitimate 
governance comes from the openness and ability to delegate 
sovereignty found in the national constitutional system. As such, the 
ability of the supranational institutions to act in a constitutional 
manner remains very much tied to the constraints and possibilities 
determined not in the Treaties but in the national arenas.  
Given the points raised by Rasmussen and Bignami, it is perhaps 
best to envision the evolving European legal system as fragile, 
partially utilized, highly dynamic, and contingent on a successful 
symbiosis of national interests and European aspirations. It is a legal 
space that arises at the convergence of contest and compromise 
among competing conceptions of effectiveness, utility, and national 
conditioning. It is a legal patchwork, in which a relatively unified 
constitutional paradigm has been promoted by particular institutions 
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and academic groups and which has been captured in the case law of 
the ECJ. Its promotion has been heavily contested right from the 
start. Different national contexts and legal traditions have resulted in 
varying conditions being placed on the acceptance of the 
constitutional paradigm. Some member states have accepted it 
relatively easily; others have not. With this disparate reception, it is 
difficult to stand by the position that the Treaties have been 
successfully turned into a proto-federal constitution resulting in a 
proper European rule of law. This delicate and rather fragile 
equilibrium between the national and European levels is what the 
New Historians refer to as a “constitutional practice.” Our work now 
consists of continuing to enlarge the rather small-n75 of case studies 
that we are currently able to master in order to better understand this 
constitutional practice and to offer EU legal scholars a more 
comprehensive definition of what this means for their scholarship 
and profession. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The New History of European Law offers the potential for 
reassessing a number of important questions about the origins, 
evolution, and contemporary implications of the EU’s legal structures. 
It remains a new field of study, and there are a multitude of avenues 
for further research that need to be traversed. This hopelessly light 
response to the important questions raised in the commentaries will 
have to remain as such until more time is spent in the various national 
and European archives by historians and other scholars interested in 
discovering just how this important and unique system came to be. 
Much remains to be done. We have still to develop collaborative and 
historiographical links with our “cousins” working in U.S. legal 
history. Whole fields of “law” remain unexplored; from the 1970s 
alone, hugely important topics relating to citizenship, fiscal policy, and 
the strengthening of the European Parliament need to be researched 
and integrated into the stories we already have. Furthermore, a 
fleshing out of the “constitutional practice” interpretation is needed. I 
hope that some of the questions raised here in response to other 
questions will prompt further research and collaboration in this 
important, interesting, and still-underdeveloped historical field. 
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